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Abstract— The aim of this paper is to asses simultaneous 
spectrum access situations that may occur in Cognitive Radio 
(CR) environments. The approach is that of one-shot, non-
cooperative games describing CR interactions. Open spectrum 
access scenarios are modelled based on continuous and discrete 
reformulations of the Cournot game theoretical model. CR 
interaction situations are described by Nash and Pareto 
equilibria. Also, the heterogeneity of players is captured by the 
new concept of joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium, allowing CRs to be 
biased toward different types of equilibrium. Numerical 
simulations reveal equilibrium situations that may be reached in 
simultaneous access scenarios of two and three users.  
Keywords - open spectrum access, cognitive radio 
environments, spectrum-aware communications, non-cooperative 
one-shot games. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is seen as the key enabler 
for next generation communication networks, which will be 
spectrum-aware, dynamic spectrum access networks [1], [2], 
[3]. Cognitive radios (CRs) hold the promise for an efficient 
use of the radio resources and are seen as the solution to the 
current low usage of the radio spectrum [2], [4], [5]. In a CR 
environment users strategically compete for spectrum resources 
in dynamic scenarios. 
In this paper the problem of simultaneous, open spectrum 
access is addressed from a game theoretical perspective. Game 
Theory (GT) provides a fertile framework and the 
computational tools for CR interaction analysis. By devising 
GT simulations, insight may be gained on unanticipated 
situations that may arise in spectrum access. Clearly CR 
interactions are strategic interactions [8]: the utility of one CR 
agent/player depends on the actions of all the other CRs in the 
area.  
The proposed approach relies on the following 
assumptions: (i) CRs have perfect channel sensing and RF 
reconfiguration capabilities [2], [6], [7], (ii) CRs are myopic, 
self-regarding players, (iii) repeated interaction among the 
same CRs is not likely to occur on a regular basis [9], and (iv) 
CRs do not know in advance what actions the other CRs will 
choose.  
These are reasons to consider one-shot, non-cooperative 
games for the open spectrum access analysis.  
An oligopoly competition game model – Cournot – is 
reformulated in terms of spectrum access. Continuous and 
discrete instances of the game are analyzed. 
Nash and Pareto equilibria are revisited for the discrete 
instance of the game. Heterogeneity of players is captured by 
joint Nash-Pareto equilibria, allowing CRs to be biased toward 
different types of equilibrium.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides some 
basic insights on game-equilibria detection. The reformulation 
of Cournot game theoretic model for simultaneous, open 
spectrum access is described in Section III. Section IV 
discusses simulation results obtained for continuous and 
discrete instances of the game. Conclusions are presented in 
Section V. 
II. GAME EQUILIBRIA IN BRIEF 
A strategic-form game model is defined by its three major 
components: a finite set of players, a set of actions, and a 
payoff/utility function which measures the outcome for each 
player, determined by the actions of all players [8], [10]. 
A game may be defined as a system G = ((N, Si, ui), i = 
1,…, n) where: 
(i) N represents the set of n players, N = {1,…, n}. 
(ii) for each player i є N, Si represents the set of actions Si = 
{si1, si2, …, sim}; nSSSS ...21 ××=  is the set of all possible 
game situations; 
(iii) for each player i є N, ui :S → R represents the payoff 
function. 
A strategy profile is a vector ),,...,( 1 nsss =  where 
ii Ss ∈ is a strategy (or action) of player i. By ),( *ii ss −  we 
denote the strategy profile obtained from s* by replacing the 
strategy of player i with si, i.e. 
).,...,,,,...,,(),( ** 1* 1*2*1* niiiii ssssssss +−− =  
A strategy profile in which each player’s strategy is a best 
response to the strategies of the other players is a Nash 
equilibrium (NE) [8], [11]. Informally, a strategy profile is a 
Nash equilibrium if no player can improve her payoff by 
unilateral deviation. 
Considering two strategy profiles x and y from S, the 
strategy profile x is said to Pareto dominate the strategy profile 
y (and we write x <P y) if the payoff of each player using 
strategy x is greater or equal to the payoff associated to 
strategy y and at least one payoff is strictly greater. The set of 
all non-dominated strategies (Pareto frontier) represents the set 
of Pareto equilibria of the game [8]. 
In an n-player game consider that each player i acts based 
on a certain type of rationality ri, i = 1,…, n. We may consider 
a three-player game where r1 = Nash, r2 = Nash, and r3 = 
Pareto. The first two players are biased towards the Nash 
equilibrium and the other one is Pareto-biased. Thus, a new 
type of equilibrium, called the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium 
(N-P), may be considered [15]. The considered generalization 
involves heterogeneous players that are biased towards 
different equilibrium types or may act based on different types 
of rationality [15]. 
Games can be viewed as multiobjective optimization 
problems, where the payoffs of the participating players are to 
be maximized [15]. An appealing technique is the use of 
generative relations and evolutionary algorithms for detecting 
equilibrium strategies. The payoff of each player is treated as 
an objective and the generative relation induces an appropriate 
dominance concept, which is used for fitness assignment 
purpose [21]. 
Game equilibria may be characterized by generative 
relations on the set of game strategies [21]. The idea is that the 
non-dominated strategies with respect to the generative 
relation equals (or approximate) the equilibrium set. 
Let us denote by IN the set of Nash-biased players and by IP 
the set of Pareto-biased players. We may write: 
 =  ∈ 1, . . , 
| = ℎ and 
 =  ∈ 1, . . , 
| = . 
E(x,y) measures the relative efficiency of strategy x with 
respect to strategy y, and is defined by: 
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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The N-P dominance relation <NP, defined as x <NP y if  
E(y,x) < E(x,y), 
 
may be considered as the generative relation for joint Nash-
Pareto equilibria. 
In the following, both continuous and discrete instances of 
a game are considered. As there is no direct calculus method 
for discrete equilibria an heuristic method based on other 
principles is needed. We propose the use of a method 
combining the algorithmic character of a game (through 
generative relations) with an evolutionary technique [15]. The 
generative relation allows comparison of two strategies and 
may serve for fitness assignment purposes in an evolutionary 
procedure. 
Numerical experiments aim the detection of pure equilibria 
or a combination of equilibria paralleling CRs interaction. A 
slight modification of NSGA2 [19], called GTNSGA2 is 
considered. 
III. OPEN SPECTRUM ACCESS MODELLING 
The problem of open spectrum access is modelled as a non-
cooperative, one-shot game. We consider the Cournot standard 
oligopoly competition model, reformulated in terms of radio 
resource access. CR simultaneous access situations are 
considered and modelled as one-shot games. As simultaneous 
spectrum access scenarios do not imply large numbers of users, 
two and three-player games are considered relevant. 
Continuous and discrete instances of the game are analyzed.  
We analyze different types of game equilibria, as they 
describe several types of strategic interactions between 
cognitive agents – each CR’s action directly affects the other 
CRs payoffs. 
Open spectrum access model – Cournot reformulation 
In the Cournot economic competition model players are 
firms that simultaneously choose quantities [8].  
We consider a general open spectrum access scenario that 
can be modelled as a reformulation of the Cournot oligopoly 
game [12].  
Suppose there are n radios attempting to access the same set 
of available channels, simultaneously. Each CR i may decide 
the number ci of simultaneous channels to access. The 
question is how many simultaneous channels should each CR 
access in order to maximize its operation efficiency? 
As mentioned before, a strategic-form game model is 
defined by its three major components: set of players, set of 
actions, and payoffs. For a general open access scenario the 
Cournot competition may be reformulated as follows:  
 
Players  cognitive radios simultaneously attempting to 
access a certain set of channels W; 
Actions  the strategy of each player i is the number ci of 
simultaneously accessed channels;  
A strategy profile is a vector c = ( c1,…,cn). 
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput 
P(C)ci and the cost of accessing ci simultaneous 
channels Kci. 
 
A linear inverse demand function is considered – the 
number of non-interfered symbols P(C) is determined from 
the total number C of accessed channels (occupied 
bandwidth). 
The demand function may be defined as: 
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where W > 0 is the parameter of the inverse demand function, 
and C = ∑
=
n
i
ic
1
is the total number of accessed channels. 
The goodput for CR i is P(C)ci . Radio i’s cost for 
supporting ci simultaneous channels is Kci.  
The payoff of CR i may then be written as: 
iii KccCPcu −= )()( . 
The payoff function is kept simple in order to focus on the 
emergent phenomena. The computational model allows for 
more complex payoff functions to be implemented, accounting 
for various parameters, but the essence is captured here. In 
general, P decreases with the total number of implemented 
channels C, and the total cost for supporting ci simultaneous 
channels, Kci, increases with ci (more bandwidth implies more 
processing resources and more power consumption) [12].  
If these effects are approximated by linear functions, the 
payoff function can be rewritten as: 
ii
n
k
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where   
W is the number of available channels, and   
K is the cost of accessing one channel.  
 
The Nash equilibrium, considered the solution of this game, 
can be calculated as follows: 
Ν∈∀+−= inKWci ),1/()(* . 
Pareto and Nash-Pareto equilibria are described by the 
generative relations [15] presented in Section II. 
    
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
In order to illustrate open spectrum access situations, 
scenarios with two and three CRs simultaneously trying to 
access a given set of channels are considered. CR strategies 
and payoffs are represented two- and three-dimensionally. As 
the continuous modelling captures only partially the variety of 
possible equilibrium situations, discrete instances of the game 
are also considered. 
The results represent a sub-set of more extensive 
simulations. For equilibria detection the evolutionary 
technique from [15] is considered. A population of 100 
strategies is evolved using a rank based fitness assignment 
technique. In all experiments the process converges in less 
than 100 generations. Our tests indicate that the evolutionary 
method for equilibrium detection is scalable with respect to 
the number of available channels [20]. 
Following the game formulation in Section III, the 
simulation parameters are chosen: W = 10 (available channels) 
and K = 1 (cost of accessing one channel). 
A. Continuous Cournot modelling, 2-player simultaneous 
access 
Simulation results are presented for the Cournot 
competition with two CRs simultaneously trying to access a 
set of channels. The stable interaction situations are captured 
by the detected equilibria (Fig. 1): Nash, Pareto, Nash-Pareto, 
and Pareto-Nash. The four types of equilibria are obtained in 
separate runs. Fig. 2 illustrates the payoffs of the two CRs 
u1(c1, c2) and u2(c1, c2). 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the NE corresponds to a situation 
where each of the two CRs activates 3 channels (from 10 
available). The NE indicates the maximum number of 
channels a Nash-biased player may access without decreasing 
its payoff (Fig. 2). NE is a stable point from which no CR has 
any incentive to individually deviate. 
The Pareto equilibrium (Fig. 2) describes a larger range of 
payoffs, capturing unbalanced as well as equitable situations 
(the two ends of the front vs. the middle). Although each CR 
tries to maximize its utility, none of them can access more 
than half of the available channels: c ∈  [0, 4.5] (Fig.1). The 
Pareto payoffs (Fig. 2) are in the range [0, 20] and their sum is 
always larger than the NE payoff (9,9). 
 
Figure 1.  Cournot modelling – two radios (W = 10, K = 1). Evolutionary 
detected equilibria: Nash (3,3), Pareto, Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash 
 
Figure 2.  Cournot modelling – two radios (W = 10, K = 1). Payoffs of the 
evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (9, 9), Pareto, N-P, and P-N. 
In some cases, a Nash-Pareto situation enables the CR to 
access more channels than for the NE strategy (Fig.1). A N-P 
equilibrium captures the situation where one CR wants to keep 
its payoff (and chooses a Nash leading strategy) whereas the 
other CR goes for the maximum payoff (and chooses a Pareto 
leading strategy). In the performed experiments the P-N 
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equilibrium is symmetric to the N-P equilibrium with respect 
to NE. In the continuous instance of the game none of the N-P 
strategies actually reach NE (Fig. 1). 
Even if the N-P strategies allow the CRs to access more 
channels (Fig. 1), the payoffs are smaller than for the Pareto 
strategies (Fig. 2). This mirrors the effect of interference 
increasing with the number of accessed channels. 
B. Discrete Cournot modelling – 2-player simultaneous 
access 
Continuous Cournot modelling does not capture the variety 
of possible situations. A discrete instance of the game seems 
more realistic as CRs’ strategies represent the number of 
accessed channels. A generalization of Cournot game allowing 
discrete strategies is proposed. 
The evolutionary detected Nash, Pareto, N-P, and P-N 
equilibria, for the discrete instance of the game, are captured 
in Fig. 3. The discrete instance of the game reveals new 
equilibria: there are three NE strategies (2,4), (3,3), and (4,2). 
The existence of multiple NEa indicates a flexibility in 
choosing the number of accessed channels. There are more 
situations from which the CRs have no incentive to 
unilaterally deviate. Also, the three NE payoffs (6,12), (9,9), 
(12,6) offer a satisfactory diversity of utilities (Fig.4). 
Whether in the continuous instance of the game none of the 
N-P or P-N strategies actually reach NE, in the discrete 
instance they overlap the three NEa (Fig. 3). 
The (3,3) NE is the most stable game situation as it 
maintains even for N-P and P-N strategies (the overlapping of 
symbols in Fig.3). The other two NEa, (2,4) and (4,2), are also 
stable and are maintained for one of the joint strategies – N-P 
or P-N, respectively. 
We may also notice the overlapping of most N-P and P-N 
equilibria onto Pareto equilibria (Fig.3 and Fig.4). This may 
indicate that Pareto optimality is maintained in most cases 
even if a CR plays Nash and the other one plays Pareto. 
We may say that, for this particular instance of the game 
(W=10, K=1), heterogeneity of players does not affect the 
game equilibria. 
C. Continuous Cournot modelling, 3-player simultaneous 
access 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 illustrate the equilibrium situations for 
three CRs simultaneously sharing a set of channels W=10.  
The NE (Fig. 5) corresponds to a situation where each of 
the three CRs activates 2 channels (from 10 available). The 
NE indicates the maximum number of channels a Nash-biased 
CR may access without decreasing its payoff (Fig. 5). NE is a 
stable point from which no CR has any incentive to 
individually deviate. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Discrete Cournot modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1). 
Evolutionary detected equilibrium strategies: Nash (2,4), (3,3), (4,2) Pareto, 
Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash. 
 
Figure 4.  Discrete Cournot modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1). Payoffs of 
the evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (6,12), (9,9), (12,6), Pareto, N-P, 
and P-N. 
As expected, when 3 CRs share the same set of available 
channels, the number of accessed channels per CR and their 
respective payoffs decrease (compared to the 2-CR access 
scenario): NE strategy is (2.25, 2.25, 2.25) and NE payoff is 
(5.05, 5.05, 5.05). 
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 Figure 5.  Continuous Cournot modelling – three radios (W=10, K=1).  
Evolutionary detected equilibrium strategies: Nash (2.25, 2.25, 2.25), Pareto, 
N-N-P, and N-P-P. 
 
Figure 6.  Continuous Cournot modelling – 3 radios (W=10, K=1).  Payoffs 
of the evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (5.05, 5.05, 5.05), Pareto, N-N-P, 
and N-P-P. 
In the 3-player game the variety of joint Nash-Pareto 
equilibrium situations increases combinatorially. For 
illustration we chose Nash-Nash-Pareto and Pareto-Pareto-
Nash equilibria (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6). In order to get a better 
view of the equilibria we turn to the discrete instance of the 
game.  
D. Discrete Cournot modelling, 3-player simultaneous access 
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 capture the equilibrium situations for the 
discrete modelling of the 3-CR simultaneous access.  
Seven Nash equilibria (2,2,2), (2,2,3),  (2,3,2),  (3,2,2), 
(1,3,3),  (3,1,3), (3,3,1) can be identified. This indicates an 
even higher flexibility in choosing the number of accessed 
channels for each CR. Also the range of satisfactory payoffs is 
increased. NE payoffs are (6, 6, 6), (4, 4, 6), (4, 6, 4) , (6, 4, 
4), (2, 6, 6), (6, 2, 6), (6, 6, 2). 
 
Figure 7.  Discrete Cournot modelling, 3 CRs (W=10, K=1). Strategies: 
Nash: (2,2,2), (2,2,3),  (2,3,2),  (3,2,2), (1,3,3),  (3,1,3), (3,3,1), Pareto, N-N-P, 
and N-P-P. 
 
Figure 8.  Discrete Cournot modelling, 3 CRs (W=10, K=1). Payoffs: Nash 
(6, 6, 6), (4, 4, 6), (4, 6, 4), (6, 4, 4), (2, 6, 6), (6, 2, 6), (6, 6, 2), Pareto, N-N-
P, and N-P-P. 
We may notice that N-N-P and P-P-N no longer overlap 
Pareto and Nash equilibria. The heterogeneity of players has a 
visible impact on the game equilibria – new equilibrium 
situations appear (the distinct Nash-Pareto equilibria). 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
One-shot games are considered in order to assess non-
iterative spectrum access scenarios. Open spectrum access 
scenarios are modelled based on continuous and discrete 
reformulations of the Cournot game theoretical model. 
Simultaneous access of two and three CRs is analyzed. Nash 
and Pareto equilibria are revisited in the discrete instance of 
the game. Heterogeneity of players is captured by joint Nash-
Pareto equilibria. 
Numerical simulations reveal equilibrium situations that 
may be reached in simultaneous access scenarios. Besides 
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Nash and Pareto equilibria new equilibrium situations 
establish, especially in the 3-player game. 
Continuous Cournot modelling does not capture the variety 
of possible situations. Discrete instances of the game reveal 
multiple Nash equilibria and distinct Nash-Pareto equilibria. 
This indicates more flexibility for the CRs in choosing 
satisfactory spectrum access strategies. 
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